I’ve seen some remarks on social media concerning philosophy and humility lately that have got me thinking. It was in relation to some discussion of The Guardian review of Daniel Dennett’s new memoir, I’ve Been Thinking. Stuart Jeffries, in his review of the book, remarks on Dennett’s apparent recurring pride throughout the book, writing that Dennett’s inability to be humble gets in the way of the book possessing some of the higher aspirations of Dennett’s own approach to philosophy.
My own take on this issue is somewhat complex. For the purposes of the present discussion, I'm thinking of humility as related to magnanimity (i.e., knowing one's capacities and limits, a sort of removal of egotism from philosophical activity). I am also thinking here of humility as a virtue; knowing what humility is and being humble are two different things. In perhaps an Aristotelian sense, one might approach thinking of humility as a habit that one can (attempt to) put into practice.
I personally think humility is of the utmost importance when it comes to philosophy (i.e., as an aspiration). It’s important for teaching, to leave space for students to enter into the discourse explored in a class; without the evident sincerity of the teacher inviting students to speak, many of them just won’t. It’s important for research, to remember that perhaps a great many philosophers, and other figures, have already thought about (broadly speaking) what you right now are thinking about. (This is important especially to correct for the many sins of analytic philosophy which has all too often been stridently and unrepentantly ahistorical). Even when you think you’re the first scholar to find a topic or a perspective, if you look around you, there have likely been others who have had similar thoughts. It’s also important for working with others, to being a good colleague. This all seems obvious to me, but perhaps in other contexts or with different experiences in mind, humility wouldn’t be such a positive trait.
Yet, I also recognize that there are a large plurality of ways to do philosophy. This is a good thing. While some of my favorite philosophers are actually, successfully humble (I’m thinking here of Hilary Putnam), I get a kick sometimes out of philosophers who aren’t. When I think of Marx, Nietzsche, or even Wittgenstein, I think of philosophers who were massively ambitious in their philosophizing and ruthlessly blunt in communication, and sometimes, they were quite effective at achieving their philosophical ends for those reasons. While I would not put Dennett in this company, I find his writing and public speaking amusing and thought provoking. I particularly liked his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained. I disagree strongly with what he has written in my area, philosophy of religion, and have written a little about this myself, but I think he is a clever and accessible writer who has brought some philosophical thinking to a broad audience, well beyond the usual confines of philosophy departments and the academy itself. There is real value in that.
Perhaps, then, it is not a requirement for philosophers to be humble. Still, if there were fewer humble philosophers, I think it would be a real loss. Self-scrutiny and reluctance to speak for others can be genuine philosophical virtues.