Monday, December 19, 2022

Existentially Important Issues & Philosophy of Religion

Keith Haring, Moses and the Burning Bush (1985)

I’ve long felt that the standing that philosophy of religion occupies in the field of philosophy is disproportionate to its potential importance in contending with critically important contemporary problems (e.g., in connection with environmental crises, racism and cultural diversities, the nature of democratic politics and ideas of nationhood, and so on). 

One can perhaps sense this potential in a work like Martin Hägglund’s This Life, with his critique of “religious faith” (which in his view focuses on the value of a next life) and valorizing of “secular faith” (which he sees as aspiring to make this life as good as possible). Even if one thinks Hägglund is far too hasty and sweeping in his depiction of religious traditions and their ultimate goals (as I do), he's certainly correct in holding that an attitude of faith or hope in addressing the many problems facing particular societies and/or the world as a whole is a matter of great importance. Others, such as David Newheiser, have also been exploring similar issues relating to hope, secularity, and deconstruction.

Of course, a lot of philosophy of religion does not concern itself with urgent existential concerns of the moment, and need not. When conducted in traditional contexts, philosophy of religion has focused on the local ends of the religion, culture, or time in question. I think here of the prayerful framing of Augustine’s Confessions or Anselm’s Proslogion (See John Clayton’s chapter “The Otherness of Anselm” in Religions, Reasons, and Gods). But I believe that some philosophy of religion should be engaged with existentially important issues and indeed that more and more does.

This sense of existential concern motivated me to write a conference paper back in 2010 that became an article, “The Problem of Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Religion.” I first wrote the paper shortly after graduating from my PhD program at BU into the dire economic situation of the Great Recession and its consequent impacts on the humanities job market. At the time, it was unclear what sort of future philosophy of religion might have; it is still very unclear, but I am glad to see some signs of growth in globally engaged philosophy of religion over the last few years.

I gave an early version of the relevance paper at the AAR in 2010 and then adapted it into an article manuscript in 2013 at the same time as I was also preparing my manuscript for Wittgenstein Within the Philosophy of Religion. For this reason, the book and the article echo each other (especially in the book’s final chapters, with a reference to H. H. Price’s lecture “Clarity is Not Enough” and to the “crisis” facing philosophy of religion). 

My overall argument in the article did not depend so directly upon a reading of Wittgenstein, and my hope was that the article would have a wider readership than if I had made it explicitly about Wittgenstein. After surveying the precarious situation for philosophy of religion within the then contemporary academy, I argue in the article for three courses of action that would improve the academic and social relevance of philosophy of religion:

1. Critical self-awareness about one’s aims of inquiry and one’s audience(s). 

2. Investigation and analysis of concepts used by scholars in neighboring areas (e.g., philosophers, religious studies scholars). 

3. Focus on arguments and issues of contemporary practical urgency.

These days, I am most interested in the last of these courses of action, not for some utilitarian reason of advancing the interests of philosophy of religion in the academy but for how philosophy of religion may help people contend with the urgent practical issues in our world.

As I mentioned in a previous post, I concluded my Philosophy of Religion course with some reflection on existentially important issues. The idea wasn’t to identify what those most important issues are but to challenge students to consider for themselves what they thought were the one or two most important issues. Partly, I did this because I want students to consider the field not just a part of the global history of philosophy but as a potentially ongoing field of academic inquiry (a point that is potentially controversial in the Chinese context).

In my next post, I’ll reflect some of the remarks students posted in an online forum about existentially important issues.